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In the first week we consider the problem of aggregating different agents' preferences, discussing voting rules and the challenges faced in collective decision making. We present some of the most important theoretical results in the area: notably, Arrow's Theorem, which proves that there is no "perfect" voting system, and also the Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite Theorems. We move on to consider the problem of making collective decisions when agents are self interested and can strategically misreport their preferences. We explain "mechanism design" -- a broad framework for designing interactions between self-interested agents -- and give some key theoretical results. Our third week focuses on the problem of designing mechanisms to maximize aggregate happiness across agents, and presents the powerful family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms. The course wraps up with a fourth week that considers the problem of allocating scarce resources among self-interested agents, and that provides an introduction to auction theory.
Suggested Readings: Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations.
Syllabus
WEEK 1
Social Choice
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WEEK 2
Mechanism Design
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WEEK 3
Efficient Mechanisms
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WEEK 4
Auctions
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WEEK 5
Final Exam
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MOOC List is learner-supported. When you buy through links on our site, we may earn an affiliate commission.
MOOC List is learner-supported. When you buy through links on our site, we may earn an affiliate commission.